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Dumping: Confronting the
Paradox of Internal Weakness
and External Challenge
BART S. FISHER
Large-scale, continuous dumping is essentially the
transmission of an economic adjustment problem from one country
to another. When dumping reaches acute proportions it may create
foreign policy problems involving the maintenance of good relations
among nation-states as well as economic adjustment problems for
the importing country.
Unfortunately, dumping today poses serious foreign policy prob-
lems for the United States, particularly with respect to many other
advanced industrial states. Dumping is but one of a series of major
economic issues faced by the United States today in the international
arena, however, and its importance should not be emotionalized or
overstated.
The salience of dumping as an issue is, in fact, merely a reflection
of the basic transformation which is currently taking place in the
international system. We are moving out of an era dominated by
military issues into an era in which war in the form of direct confron-
tations between major states may virtually disappear.' This is due to
many reasons, not the least of which is the awesome increase in the
ability to inflict irreparable harm on the human race.
2
As the use of force declines as an instrument of developed country
policies, the use of economic methods of competition as instruments
of national policy can be expected to increase. 3 It is irrelevant
whether power in this context is perceived as a zero-sum concept,
flowing from the "security" to the "economic" realm. Perhaps, as
Tucker has argued, all power is at a discount, with economic issues
merely appearing to grow in salience. 4 The fact remains that we
are entering a new international environment in which conflicts
Bart S. Fisher is a member of the District of Columbia Bar; a partner in the
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between nations will typically involve the allocation of economic re-
sources, rather than the traditional type of conflicts over ideological
or military objectives.
Dumping today involves considerable amounts of economic re-
sources. Thus, the proper response to foreign dumping is a matter of
"high" foreign policy for the United States.
5
The principal paradox posed by the recent increase in dumping by
many advanced industrial states is that it is simultaneously a reflec-
tion of internal weakness by the dumping country and external chal-
lenge to the importing country. As a general rule, countries attempt
to confront other countries with challenges from a position of
strength in important foreign policy matters. 6 Many countries have
recently engaged in large-scale continuous dumping into the United
States market, however, because they are weakened economically by
recessionary forces, increased oil prices, and chronic overcapacity in
key sectors. Equally important, they are enfeebled politically by frag-
ile governments unable to cope with powerful domestic groups seek-
ing a larger share of the national product. These governments may
not only condone dumping, but support it through subsidies or other
market-related schemes in order to achieve national objectives. In-
creasingly, the distinction between subsidies and dumping is becom-
ing more blurred, and the solutions to both problems should be ap-
proached in a coordinated manner.
In yet another paradox, the weakness-indeed, the desperation-of
certain trading partners has become a key element in their strength.
7
The chronic weakness of dumping states may become an insurance
policy against -vigorous enforcement of the United States antidump-
ing laws, especially by those in the United States government who
have become fearful of growing Eurocommunism. Continuous dump-
ing may conceivably evolve into a permissible concealed form of de-
valuation used to subsidize excess employment, underwrite oil costs,
and carry unneeded capacity.
While most large-scale dumping today appears to be the result of
weakness, it presents an external challenge to the economic system
of the importing country by creating dislocations in employment and
capital investments and lessened profitability for business enter-
prises.8 It also creates political tensions between the dumping coun-
try and the importing country. On the benefit side of the equation,
dumping presents lower prices to consumers, results in more compe-
tition and improved industrial performance, and acts as an anti-
inflationary mechanism of price control.
The United States must make a delicate calculus, taking into ac-
count the benefits of dumping, as well as its costs. The analysis is
complicated, and does not lend itself to simplistic solutions that are
either "free trade" or "protectionist" in nature. Like trade itself,
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dumping has become increasingly politicized. The solutions must
therefore be balanced ones, taking into account political as well as
economic and legal factors.
Before solutions can be proferred, three questions need to be
answered:
1. what is dumping;
2. has dumping increased; and
3. assuming so, why is increased dumping taking place.
After considering these three questions seriatim, this article con-
cludes that vigorous enforcement of the United States antidumping
laws is in the best interests of the United States and an open world
trading system. This policy is not antithetical to a free trade policy
for the United States; rather, it is the essential precondition for a
continuation of the liberal trade policy pursued by the United States
since the commencement of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934.
THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF DUMPING
Apart from the legal definitions of dumping,9 the practice by econo-
mists has traditionally been to subdivide dumping into three tempo-
ral categories: sporadic, intermittent, and continuous or persistent.
Sporadic dumping typically involves the occasional sale of overstock
at low prices in "fire sale" fashion. As such, it poses little concern to
the importing country. Intermittent dumping, on the other hand, is of
greater concern to the importing country, as the dumper in this case
tries to establish a foothold by selling for brief periods at prices less
than fair value. After the foreign competitor is eliminated, the
dumper may then raise his prices to the detriment of consumers.
There appears to be a consensus that this form of predatory dumping
is an unfair foreign trade practice that should be moved against.10
Whether large-scale continuous dumping poses problems or bene-
fits for the importing country is a subject of intense controversy."
Continuous dumping over an extended period of time may exist for a
variety of economic reasons, including a desire to obtain economies
of scale from fixed assets or to shore up a nation's balance of trade
posture. It may also reflect a political decision to continue an essen-
tially unprofitable enterprise and maintain a given level of employ-
ment. Recent cases of large-scale continuous dumping appear to
have involved the steel (1976, 1977),12 electronics (1971, 1972),13
automobile (1974, 1975),14 and sugar (1977, 1978) 15 industries. It is
important to distinguish the major market incursions that have
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occurred in these areas from the sporadic or predatory dumping prac-
tice of a particular enterprise. The latter simply involves a particular-
ized adversary proceeding between private parties; the former are
national controversies involving either public enterprises or enter-
prises pursuing national objectives in a parallel manner.
The public policy question raised by large-scale continuous dump-
ing is the focus of this article; the legal and economic issues raised
by all three types of dumping have been addressed by the author in
an earlier article. 16
In general, a continuous dumping scheme cannot long endure
without governmental assistance in the form of subsidies or barriers
to reentry of the dumped or similar goods. 17 These forms of govern-
mental assistance are generally the condition precedent to a success-
ful continuous dumping scheme; they act as handmaidens to the
secure position of the exporting firm in the home market country.
Continuous dumping, under any definition, must be distinguished
from import-penetration situations involving fairly priced goods or
goods competing on their merits without artificial assistance. For
example, section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is designed to deal
with imports of goods causing serious injury to domestic industry;
the price of imported goods is relevant, but not dispositive in this
form of proceeding. Since fair competition is generally involved, the
injury standard' and administrative procedures'19 make it very diffi-
cult to obtain import-limiting actions from the Executive branch. 20 In
contrast, once dumping has been established, antidumping duties
may be obtained if anything more than de minimis injury is estab-
lished.2' Whether or not economists and lawyers agree, Congress and
the International Trade Commission will require a lower standard of
injury when dumping is involved in the import transaction.
HAS DUMPING INCREASED?
Like the definition of dumping, the magnitude of dumping into the
United States marketplace is a perplexing question. The amount of
dumping can be measured in terms of cases actually processed at the
Treasury Department, affirmative dumping injury decisions ren-
dered by the International Trade Commission (hereinafter ITC), or
on a qualitative basis. Each barometer of dumping has major flaws.
Treasury Department Proceedings
If 'one were to gauge the amount of dumping (in terms of Treasury
Department proceedings), table 1 shows that dumping has increased
dramatically since 1969, when only six cases were processed. The
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Table 1.
Cases Processed by the Treasury Department, 1969-78










1978 (through August, 1978) 28
Source: U.S. Customs Service, Department of the
Treasury.
absolute numbers do not indicate the volume of trade involved, the
number of potentially valid petitions that were either never filed or
never accepted due to lack of information, or the greater difficulty in
obtaining acceptance of petitions after 1974. On the other hand, it
seems safe to say that the increase in cases processed by Treasury
reflects the increased dumping that has occurred since 1969.
International Trade Commission Proceedings
A finding of dumping follows a bifurcated proceeding. After Treasury
establishes sales at less than fair value the petitioner must also prove
to the ITC that injury to an American industry has occurred or is
likely to occur as a result of the foreign dumping. The International
Trade Commission record of affirmative injury decisions has varied
greatly. These ITC findings (which follow in table 2) do not reflect
cases of dumping where no injury has been found, or discontinued
cases, such as the case of automobile dumping in 1975. Therefore,
they do not adequately measure the magnitude of dumping over the
last eight years.
A Qualitative Analysis
A qualitative analysis of steel and consumer electronics, two key
sectors of the United States economy, demonstrates the increase in
continuous dumping. Apart from the magnitude of dumping in-
volved, these sectors have been selected to illustrate differing reac-













1978 (through August, 1978) 3
Source: International Trade Commission.
Steel
The most startling increase in dumping in recent years has occurred
in the steel sector. "Big Steel" has been pilloried in the press and
by academic commentators22 since 1962, when President Kennedy
forced a rollback in the announced price increases of the industry, 23
and the industry's grasp of public relations has been less than mag-
nificent. Nevertheless, the claim of the industry that it has been vic-
timized by foreign dumping since 1976 appears to be valid.
On a price basis, Japanese price discrimination between domestic
shipments and exports to the United States appeared to be on the
order of $25 per net ton in 1976.24 On a cost basis, Japanese pro-
ducers appeared to sell at an estimated average of $32 per ton below
average cost in 1976 and an estimated $46 below average cost for the
first nine months of 1977, behavior that would also qualify as dump-
ing under the second legal definition of dumping discussed above. 25
Given the bad press Japanese economic policy has received in re-
cent years, the allegation of steel dumping from Japan might merit
little more than a yawn. The truly astonishing aspect of the steel
dumping story in 1977 was the performance in the United States
marketplace of steel exporters from the European Economic Commu-
nity (hereinafter EEC). In 1977, while the exports of steel from Japa-
nese producers actually declined somewhat in volume, imports into
the United States from European producers more than doubled from
3.2 million to 6.8 million tons (table 3). The EEC found it difficult in
1976 and 1977 to organize its steel market due to the problem of
domestic discounting among the nine members of the Community.
To remedy this tendency towards discounting and protect the domes-
tic market, the EEC instituted two plans in 1976 and 1977, known as
the Simonet2 6 and Davignon plans. Viscount Etienne Davignon, who
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Table 3.
Imports of Steel Mill Products
Thousands of Net Tons
Imports from 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Japan 5,637 6,159 5,844 7,984 7,820
EEC 6,510 6,424 4,123 3,188 6,828
All other 3,003 3,387 2,046 3,113 4,659
Total imports 15,150 15,970 12,012 14,284 19,307
Apparent consumption 122,528 119,609 89,016 101,078 108,451
Imports as percentage of
apparent consumption 12.4% 13.4% 13.5% 14.1% 17.8%
Source: Statistics from the American Iron and Steel Institute.
established his early credentials with the establishment of the Inter-
national Energy Agency (hereinafter IEA) in 1975, turned his atten-
tion to steel in 1977 with devastating results. 2 7 The Davignon Plan
for steel consists of three separate but interrelated elements:
(a) guidance prices on intra-EEC transactions28 (to be supple-
mented by required minimum prices);
(b) production quotas; and
(c) minimum base prices for imports.
The extent of dumping by the EEC in 1977 can be gleaned from a
comparison of the internal base guidance price and the average price
of exports to the United States for the major steel product categories.
Significantly, in all categories except one (steel bars), substantial
price differences are revealed (table 4).
Apart from disregarding the traditional price measurement of
dumping,29 the EEC has also engaged in significant below-cost pric-
ing 3" to the United States. Its below-cost sales performance appears
to be even more pervasive than Japan's, as it is a less efficient pro-
ducer of steel than Japan, and is therefore required to sell at lower
price levels relative to the actual cost of production than Japan.31
Evidence indicates that realized revenues on European shipments to
the United States averaged $50 per net ton below cost and profit
during the first nine months of 1977 (table 5).
If the steel industry is to be believed-and the burden of disproving
this rests with those contesting the allegation-the loss in revenue
due to lost sales caused to the domestic steel industry by dumping in
1976 and 1977 amounted to over $1.05 billion (table 6).32
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Table 4.
Price Discrimination by Steel Producers in the EEC, October through













strip $318 $240 $78
Hot rolled
sheets and
strip 239 193 46
Plates 230 203 27
Bars 250 291 -41
Structurals 250 219 31
Wire rods 260 193 67
Source: Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett Study.
Table 5.
Below-Cost Pricing of Exports to the U.S. by the EEC Steel Industry:
Standard Mix of Carbon Steel Products (in dollars per ton)
(a) (b)
Average Cost Average Realized (c)
Year Including Profit Revenue Difference
(b)-(a)
1976 $307 $257 -$50
1977 341 268* - 73
*Only nine months available for 1977.
Table 6.
Injury to the Domestic Steel Industry Caused by
Dumping in 1976 and 1977 ($ millions, before taxes)
Quantity Price Total
Year Impact Impact Injury
1976 $ 124 $ 547 $ 671
1977 933 2,411 3,344
Total $1,057 $2,958 $4,015







Steel is the classic case of a non-footloose industry.33 Continuous
dumping of steel may thus result in serious discontinuities, due to
the immobility of its labor force and the idling of its capital stock,
which cannot be easily moved to another sector or another country.
There are also significant short term inelasticities of supply, as new
steelmaking capacity requires from two to seven years to install. The
steel industry has responded to foreign dumping by idling some of its
domestic facilities. It has not transferred its capital stock overseas
for shipment into the United States.
34
Dumping may have more pernicious consequences for the owners
of the means of production of non-footloose industries such as steel,
with relatively high entry barriers. The adjustment costs for labor,
however, should not differ significantly. If dumping results in retir-
ing an excessive amount of United States steel capacity, United
States producers may be unable to meet future supply scarcities due
to the difficult market entry conditions of the industry. This, of
course, is hard to assess, and opinions with respect to the steel
situation differ dramatically. 35 The owners of the means of produc-
tion of products manufactured under a stable technology, with low
entry requirements, are better able to adjust to dumping, and in-
deed, take advantage of it, than are products produced by non-
footloose industries.
WHY HAS DUMPING INCREASED?
Dumping has increased for structural reasons. These include slow
growth and unemployment in the OECD area, increased oil prices,
and overcapacity. Increased dumping is also a result of conscious
decisions to expand market shares.
Slow Growth and Unemployment in the OECD Area
The dominant pattern of activity in the OECD area is that of slow
growth in output and trade, and a continued rate of high unemploy-
ment. GNP growth for 1978 seems likely to stay around 3.5 percent,
about the same as 1977. Unemployment will remain around the level
of 5.3 percent for the OECD area, and the OECD predicts that re-
corded unemployment in OECD area countries could increase by
more than half a million persons in early 1979.36 The rise in unem-
ployment seems likely to be widespread in continental Europe de-
spite large-scale European efforts to support employment through
subsidies and other measures. 37 Moreover, a general slowdown in
productivity growth3s has added to recessionary pressures.
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The stagnation of the OECD economies has a direct bearing on the
problem of dumping. Countries mired in a recession, with high unem-
ployment rates, are very reluctant to add to their pool of unemployed.
Instead, labor will be treated as a fixed cost, much like capital equip-
ment, and workers will continue to produce items at artificially low
subsidized prices, with real unemployment being disguised. Products
may then be sold at price-discriminating levels at whatever price the
markets will bear. This may become a continuous dumping policy
under any definition, with goods being sold at even less than marginal
costs.
A cursory analysis indicates the strength of organized labor in the
OECD area, and its pervasive fixed-cost characteristic. In Italy the
organized labor force serving large enterprises has contracts that
make the dismissal of employees extremely difficult.39 In France the
Government backed off from a scheme to rationalize the steel indus-
try by reducing employment, and ended up controlling two-thirds of
the leading steel groups in France in September, 1978.40 A similar
reaction occurred recently in Belgium, 4' and in the United Kingdom
the British Steel Corporation continues to operate at relatively full
employment rates despite its fantastic financial losses in recent
years. 42 Nevertheless, there are serious strains now on the social
contract in the United Kingdom, and British workers may be ex-
pected to resist the proposals currently being made to reduce employ-
ment in the industry by 40,000 jobs.
43
The growth in power of trade unions in Europe is a classic example
of the politics of pluralistic stagnation. 44 In this type of development,
interest groups come to play a progressively greater role in the pro-
cesses of government and policymaking. This leads to immobilisme
as governments become blocked from pursuing "national interest"
policies by strong and broadly based interest groups. Unions in Brit-
ain, France, and Italy have been elevated-or have elevated them-
selves-into veto groups capable of frustrating what would other-
wise be rational economic policy.
45
In contrast, the growth of contract labor in Japan gives the Japa-
nese added flexibility in laying off workers. Thus, the traditional
view of labor as a fixed cost in Japan leading to dumping4 6 may
bear serious revision. Japan has closed down eighteen of her fifty-
eight blast furnaces since 1974. In addition, Japan's multiproduct
companies, such as Sumitomo, are shifting many workers out of
steel into other lines of production, such as automobiles. On an
overall basis, however, in Japan as in Europe, governments are
loath to take the political heat for adding to the unemployment rolls.




The second reason why dumping has increased recently relates to
the serious balance of trade deficits run by several key OECD coun-
tries since the OPEC oil price increases of 1973. In 1974 alone, the
additional cost of oil imports was $50 billion for the OECD coun-
tries. 47 The additional balance of trade deficit of the oil-importing
countries has translated into trade surpluses for the OPEC coun-
tries. Based on the 1972 OECD and OPEC trade balances, it is at
least arguable that a $250 billion dollar resource transfer has been
made to OPEC exporters by the OECD above "normal" 1972
prices.
48
To reduce these mind-boggling figures to the level of individual
countries in the OECD area might be useful. For Italy, two-thirds of
its trade deficit in the first half of 1974 was due solely to the pur-
chase of petroleum products. 49 The oil crisis has also been a severe
blow to Japan. Japan relies on oil for 70 percent of its energy needs,
and at the time the "oil shock" came, Japan imported 99 percent of
its petroleum. 50
Increased oil costs intensify recessionary pressure, which has al-
ready been cited as one key reason for dumping. Higher oil costs also
increase dumping in another respect: they augment neomercantilist
pressures on non-oil sectors of the exporting economy. Simply put,
as imports dramatically increase in cost, strong incentives are
created to promote exports in order to reduce the balance of trade
deficit.
To put the argument succinctly, it would seem that several key
OECD nations have been dumping steel and other products into the




The third major reason for increased dumping is overcapacity.
52
Overcapacity leads to dumping, as firms will reason that they should
sell at whatever price the market will bear in order to attempt to
cover their fixed costs. There appears to be substantial overcapacity
at present in the steel53 and automotiveM industries. Significant addi-
tional capacity is coming onstream in the petrochemical sector, 55 a
problem that will increase as the OPEC oil-producing countries de-
velop their own processing facilities in the next decade. 56 This may
indicate that the next major wave of dumping cases will be in the
area of petrochemicals.
57
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CONSCIOUS MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES
Finally, dumping has increased as a result of conscious market entry
strategies. The classic case of taking over a market involved the
dumping of TV sets. Promotion of a new product must be carefully
distinguished from the predatory dumping situation. 58 The latter
clearly requires swift, affirmative corrective actions under the anti-
dumping law or another statute.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN DUMPING:
THE ENIGMATIC ROLE OF THE STATE
With the exception of market entry, the goals discussed above-lower
unemployment, reduced balance of trade deficits, and use of overca-
pacity-are national objectives superimposed on the objectives of
individual enterprises. While an individual firm may be willing to lay
off workers and idle capacity, the government may not be willing to
do so for political reasons. Conversely, the government may desire to
rationalize an inefficient sector of the economy but be unable to
stand up to powerful trade unions wishing to avoid economic disloca-
tions. In each case the result is the same: labor becomes a fixed cost
that needs to be covered by the domestic enterprise. It is the thesis of
this article that dumping policies are increasingly state-led or state-
supported efforts to improve national economic postures.
In 1900 Brooks Adams said that nation-states were behaving more
and more like huge corporations in competition. 59 Today nation-
states frequently are huge corporations in competition. This is espe-
cially true in such dumping-prone sectors as steel. For example, gov-
ernments owned raw steel products enterprises in twenty-one major
countries in 1975.60 Government-owned exports to the United States
from these twenty-one countries accounted for 11.1 percent of total
United States steel imports in 1974.61
In Japan, the state has played a crucial role in the generation and
implementation of foreign economic policy.62 As early as 1950 the
government in Japan emphasized the development of the steel indus-
try. Furthermore, the government facilitates the steel industry devel-
opment by acting, in effect, as a well-controlled revolving door pro-
viding entrance to and exit from Japan.6
In Italy, state-controlled enterprises have become as significant in
domestic and international economic affairs as the large private cor-
porations. 64 The Institute for the Reconstruction of Italy (hereinafter
IRI), the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, and other state-owned enter-
prises are responsible to the Ministry for State Holdings, and the
Foreign Ministry.6 5 Finsider, the steel state-participation enterprise
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run by IRI, has, like its British counterpart, British Steel Corpora-
tion, lost enormous sums in recent years.
66
The list could continue, but, hopefully, the point has been made.
United States industries which are particularly vulnerable to dump-
ing, such as the steel industry, are private firms in which share-
holders hold management responsible for making a profit, and these
private firms are increasingly competing in a world of profitless en-
terprises with markets insulated by governmental tariff and nontariff
barriers to trade. Dumping has thus become transmogrified from the
classical profit-maximizing action of a private firm to a concealed
partial devaluation of the currency of the exporting country carried
out by the national government for national objectives.67 Instead of
its traditional role as a micro-economic industry problem, dumping is
increasingly a reflection of the macroeconomic problems of central
government authorities.
Without the ability to implement the decision to dump for the rea-
sons enumerated earlier, the objectives of national policy would
remain objectives, and not national policies implemented by the
government.
WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE UNITED STATES
RESPONSE TO DUMPING?
The United States should vigorously enforce the current antidump-
ing law. Dumping misallocates world resources,6 8 and enforcement
of the antidumping law sends a message to the dumping country that
the United States will not let that country profit from trade barriers
imposed to maintain its dumping scheme.6 9 In addition, enforcement
of antidumping law rallies support for the cause of free trade.70 Thus,
both the objectives of an open world economy and a liberal trade
policy for the United States are preserved by vigorously enforcing the
dumping law.
How vigorously the United States enforces the antidumping laws is
ultimately a political question. Other nations have dumped their eco-
nomic adjustment problems at the American doorstep and said, "You
adjust," treating the United States as if it were the world's residual
buyer of the imported product.
The American response to continuous dumping in the steel area
has been the reference price plan, or Trigger Price Mechanism (here-
inafter TPM). Essentially, this is a procedure that permits the Trea-
sury Department to institute a dumping investigation on its own ini-
tiative when import prices are below listed prices for certain steel
mill products. 71 The trigger prices are based on Japanese production
costs, which are the world's lowest.
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The reference plan is exceedingly complex and controversial, and
the jury is still out on its effectiveness. Nevertheless, some prelimi-
nary generalizations may be useful.
1. As a political device to buy time until the domestic steel industry
began to recover from its depressed condition in 1977, the TPM
was a master stroke. With unemployment reaching politically un-
acceptable levels in the steel industry in 1977, something had to
be done. A price solution, rather than a quantitative restraint so-
lution, was not overly disruptive of political relationships with
United States trading partners. Indeed, spokesmen from the Japa-
nese steel industry have commended the TPM for introducing a
measure of discipline into the pricing of steel in the United States
marketplace.
72
2. As an economic device to prop up a depressed steel industry the
TPM has worked well. Steel company profits have been fairly
strong since the introduction of the TPM, which has permitted the
industry to raise its prices by 12 percent in 1978.
73
3. As an import-limiting device, if that was its intent, the TPM has
failed miserably. Steel imports actually jumped 18.6 percent for
the first nine months of 1978, and should exceed the 1977 record
of 19.3 million tons. 74 Imports have dropped substantially from
Japan, but have increased sharply from the EEC, and other coun-
tries as shown in table 7. For the first time imports from other
countries will exceed the totals from the EEC and from Japan, as
the two traditional big suppliers are left contending for second
place.
4. The TPM continues the evolution of United States dumping en-
forcement away from price and toward the cost of production as
the referent for fair value. Enforcing the TPM has been difficult,
since production costs are obviously different for each country.
The single-tier pricing mechanism of the TPM keyed to Japanese
costs has given the EEC a "license to dump," a license to sell in
the United States at a price above the trigger price, yet below the
domestic price or cost of production. 75 The single-tier pricing
mechanism apparently reflected the political decision to move
against dumping from Japan but to risk large-scale dumping
from "our European friends. '76 The Japanese trade surplus had
become embarrassingly large in 1977, and politically unpopular
in the United States, so it was deemed politic to move against
Japan.
Whether a multi-tier TPM is to be adopted to reflect European costs
will also be a political decision. Inflationary concerns place the Ad-





Supplier 9 months, 1978 9 months, 1977 Change
EEC 5,529,666 4,373,828 +26
Japan 5,065,195 5,954,167 -15
Canada - 1,430,828 -
All
Other - 1,761,674 -
Total 16,030,958 13,520,497 +19
Source: Steel Week, October 30, 1978.
TPM would clearly be more inflationary than a single-tier TPM,
while continuation of the single-tier TPM risks additional unemploy-
ment in the steel industry, and deepening a possible recession in
1979.
The American reaction to steel dumping in 1977 and 1978 and the
decision of Treasury to discontinue the automobile dumping case in
1975 constitute admission that the current dumping laws may be
inadequate to handle large-scale continuous dumping. As the science
of economics becomes more exact it may be possible to develop more
accurate cost of production models for industry sectors. Such models
would permit the United States government to set up an "early warn-
ing" system for foreign suppliers and thus ease enforcement prob-
lems under the Antidumping Act of 1921. At the present, however, a
cost-oriented antidumping enforcement approach would have all the
disadvantages of posted prices, could tend to be inflationary if not
properly calculated, and would be inordinately complex. Notwith-
standing these negative effects, a cost-oriented antidumping enforce-
ment approach seems preferable to the alternative technique of indi-
vidual antidumping petitions in large-scale continuous dumping
cases based on price discrimination theory.
In any case, the antidumping law should not be repealed, as some
in this volume suggest. It must be improved and enforced. Inaccu-
rate antitrust analogies for determining injury from dumping
7"
should not be relied on. Instead, trade should be treated as a special
Federal responsibility, as the Constitution suggests.7 8 It does matter
to United States workers who puts them out of work, and whose
economic adjustment problem they are bearing. It does matter why
prices of goods are cheaper. To ignore these facts is to be excessively
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